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A Preliminary First Amendment
Analysis of Legislation Treating
News Aggregation as
Copyright Infringement
Alfred C. Yen*
ABSTRACT

The newspaper industry has recently experienced economic
difficulty. Profits have declined because fewer people read printed
versions of newspapers, preferringinstead to get their news through socalled "news aggregators" who compile newspaper headlines and
provide links to storied posted on newspaper websites. This harms
newspaper revenue because news aggregators collect advertising
revenue that newspapers used to enjoy.
Some have responded to this problem by advocating the use of
copyright to give newspapers the ability to control the use of their
stories and headlines by news aggregators. This proposal is
controversial, for news aggregators often do not commit copyright
infringement. Accordingly, the use of copyright to help the newspaper
industry would likely require amendment of the existing statute.
This Article analyzes the constitutionality of such potential
legislation under the First Amendment. As the Article will show,
legislation that treats news aggregation as copyright infringement
changes the traditional contours of copyright in ways that expose
copyright to serious First Amendment scrutiny. This analysis will
show that Congress does not have a completely free hand in choosing
how, if at all, to help the newspaper industry. In fact, Congress must
be careful not to unduly restrict the practice of news aggregation.
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This Article applies the First Amendment to potential
copyright legislation giving newspapers' the ability to control news
aggregation. 2 Such legislation (referred to as "aggregation control
legislation") potentially maintains or restores the profitability of news
organizations that have lost revenue as technology renders old
business models obsolete. Applying the First Amendment to such
legislation shows that, while Congress may assist a struggling news
industry, Congress must act with care to avoid suppressing the free
speech rights of news aggregators more than is reasonably necessary
to accomplish its legislative goal.
One need not go far to find stories about the declining
profitability of newspapers. 3 Many have closed, 4 leaving questions
about the future of news itself and the possible effects of that absence
on society. If newspapers cannot make enough money reporting the
news, then newsgathering itself could disappear, leaving the public
without information crucial to everyday life and the democratic
process.
1.
This Article uses the term "newspapers" to denote traditional print newspapers and
others who produce original news stories and distribute them as text in print or electronic form.
These other entities include institutions like the Associated Press and, in some cases, radio and
television broadcasters.
2.
For a description of news aggregation, see infra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
3.
See, e.g., Frank Ahrens, The Accelerating Decline of Newspapers, WASH. POST, Oct.
27, 2009, at A15, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/1O/26/
AR2009102603272.html; Tim Arango, Fall in Newspaper Sales Accelerates to Pass 7%, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 27, 2009, at B3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/28Ibusiness/media/
28paper.html; James Surowiecki, News You Can Lose, NEW YORKER, Dec. 22, 2008, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/talkdfinancial/2008/12/22/081222tatalksurowiecki.
4.
See, e.g., Lynn DeBruin & Lisa Ryckman, Rocky Mountain News to Close, Publish
Final
Edition
Friday,
ROcKY
MOUNTAIN
NEWS,
Feb.
26,
2009,
http://www.rockymountainnews.com/news/pages/special-reports/rocky-sale
(announcing closure
of the Rocky Mountain News); Dan Richman & Andrea James, Seattle P-I to Publish Last
Edition Tuesday, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 16, 2009, http://www.seattlepi.com
business/403793_piclosurel7.html (announcing last print edition of the Seattle PostIntelligencer); see also Newspaper Death Watch, http://www.newspaperdeathwatch.com/ (last
visited Apr. 2, 2010) (listing metropolitan daily newspapers that have closed since March 2007).
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Although various explanations for the decline of newspapers
exist, many commentators-including those who run newspapersblame news aggregators 5 that make unauthorized use of news
headlines and lead sentences and, as a result, disrupt traditional
newspaper business models. 6
Newspaper profits have not
traditionally depended on the straight sale of news content. Instead,
newspapers have charged readers a nominal fee for single copies of
newspapers and made the bulk of their money from selling
advertisements that readers would presumably see. 7 The Internet
changed the newspaper business by making it possible to distribute
news more quickly and inexpensively than news sources could through
print copies. Newspapers responded by putting their content online,
hoping to attract wider readership and, by extension, more eyeballs
for which to sell advertisements. 8
Unfortunately for newspapers, placing content online has not
maintained advertising revenue, for the Internet also made it easy for
those who did not author news content to deliver and profit from the
news.
Now, news aggregators can analyze multiple newspaper
websites, decide which stories will interest readers, and display
information about those stories to readers-generally the headline
and a sentence or two from the beginning of the article-along with
links to the full story. 9 Aggregators perform this task in different
5.
Examples of news aggregators include Digg, http://digg.com/ (last visited Apr. 2,
2010); Google News, http://news.google.com
(last visited Apr. 2, 2010); Newser,
http://www.newser.coml (last visited Apr. 2010); Reddit, http://www.reddit.com/ (last visited Apr.
2, 2010); Yahoo! News, http://news.yahoo.coml (last visited Apr. 2, 2010).
6.
See Nancy Herther, AP Challenges Google and Other News Aggregators at
Newspaper Conference, INFORMATION TODAY, Apr. 13, 2009, http://newsbreaks.infotoday.comI
NewsBreaks/AP-Challenges-Google-and-Other-News-Aggregators-at-Newspaper-Conference53423.asp (reporting that Associated Press Chairman Dean Singleton was "mad as hell" over
damage caused by news aggregators); Arnon Mishkin, The Fallacy of the Link Economy,
PAIDCONTENT.ORG, Aug. 13, 2009, http://paidcontent.org/article/419-the.fallacy-of-the-link.
economy/ (noting that news executives blame news aggregators for harming newspapers); David
Sarno, Murdoch accuses Google of news "theft" L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 2, 2009, at B1, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/dec/02business/la.fi-news-google2-2009dec02
(reporting that
Rupert Murdoch accused news aggregators of theft).
7.
See John Leibowitz, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, "Creative Destruction" or Just
"Destruction": How Will Journalism Survive the Internet Age? 4 (Dec. 1, 2009), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leibowitz/09120lnewsmedia.pdf
(stating
that
newspapers
traditionally received 80 percent of their revenue from advertising); Posting of Nicholas Carr
(The Great Unbundling: Newspapers & the Net) to Encyclopmdia Britannica Blog,
http://www.britannica.comfblogs/2008/04/the-great-unbundling-newspapers-the-net/
(Apr.
7,
2008) (describing importance of advertising revenue to traditional print newspapers).
8.
See Leibowitz, supra note 7, at 4-6 (describing challenges to journalism and news
gathering posed by the Internet); Carr, supra note 7 (describing changes in news resulting from
influence of the Internet, including challenges that arise as newspapers place content online).
9.
For examples of aggregators, see supra note 5.
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ways. Some use an entirely automated process, while others use
human editorial choice or a combination of the two. 10 For purposes of
this Article, however, the salient feature of news aggregation is its
ability to provide a news vehicle that readers prefer to a single
newspaper website. Newspapers therefore face declining revenue
because fewer readers actually read physical newspapers or browse
through newspaper websites. Instead, readers prefer to surf the
Internet, visiting news aggregators and clicking only on those stories
that readers care to see in full.1 1 Doing this eventually takes readers
to newspaper websites, but newspaper profits are lost because the
reader does not browse the newspaper's entire website. The reader
instead views only particular articles of interest and returns to the
aggregator's site, thereby eliminating opportunities to see further
pages-and the ads they contain-on the newspaper's website. Rather,
the reader sees more ads displayed by the aggregator, who profits
from selling them. 12 Newspapers object to this because they believe
that aggregators wrongly piggyback on the appeal of stories written by
13
the newspapers' employees.
The falling profitability of newspapers is a matter of some
concern. If gathering and writing news becomes unprofitable for

10.
See About Digg, http://about.digg.coml (last visited Apr. 2, 2010) (describing how
Digg uses community submission and community expressed interest to choose and rank
aggregated stories); About Google News, http://news.google.com/int/en-us/about-googlenews.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2010) (explaining Google News's automated process); Posting of
Josh
Catone
(5
News
Aggregation Methods
Compared)
to
ReadWriteWeb,
http://www.readwriteweb.com/archives/news-aggregation-methods.php (July 10, 2007, 12:54
EST) (describing different methods of news aggregation); Posting of Emma Heald (Google News
and Newspaper
Publishers, Allies
or
Enemies?)
to
The
Editors
Weblog,
http://www.editorsweblog.org/analysis/2009/03/google-news-and-newspaper-publishers-all.php
(Mar. 11, 2009, 15:39 EST) (describing differences between fully automated Google News
aggregator
and
human-edited
Drudge
Report);
Newser:
What
is
Newser?,
http://www.newser.comlwhat-is-newser.aspx (last visited Apr. 2, 2010) (stating that Newser
combines human editorial judgment and technology); Reddit.com: Help, What is Reddit?,
http://www.reddit.com/help/faq#Whatisreddit (last visited Apr. 2, 2010) (explaining that Reddit
relies on users to submit and rate content).
11.
See Eric Alterman, Out of Print, NEW YORKER, Mar. 31, 2008, at 48, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting2008/03/31/080331fa fact-alterman (describing the effect of
aggregation on news industry); AM. PRESS INST., NEWSPAPER ECONOMIC ACTION PLAN 3 (May
2009) ("Whole swaths of the American populace have abandoned newspapers or are growing up
without the habit of reading them, yet the Websites of news organizations attract more readers
than ever. The problem is that the online business model does not yet come close to
compensating for the steep slide in the print business model that it is replacing."); Newspapers
Face a Challenging Calculus, PEW RES. CENTER, http://pewresearch.orgpubs/1133/decline-printnewspapers-increased-online-news (describing growing reader preference for getting news online
by following links to stories).
12.
See Mishkin, supra note 6.

13.

See id.

2010]

NEWS AGGREGATION AS COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT

951

newspapers, it is at least possible that more newspapers will fold,
leaving an information-impoverished public without plentiful, reliable
news. Those who worry about this loss of print news, including the
members of the newspaper industry, have suggested using copyright
to stop news aggregators who act without the permission of the
newspapers whose stories are used. 14 This proposal is, of course,
controversial. Those who favor it undoubtedly see it as crucial to the
maintenance of newsgathering and the prevention of what they
consider as theft. 15
Others, however, harbor skepticism about
aggregation control legislation, suggesting that aggregation is actually
good for newspapers, and that attempts to prop up an outdated
business model are unproductive and doomed to fail. For example, in
a recent interview, Google CEO Eric Schmidt recognized that
newspapers face significant challenges because readers use news
aggregators. 16
He asserted that Google creates revenue for
newspapers by sending readers to newspaper websites where they will
presumably see ads, but that it was not appropriate for Google to pay

14.
See Richard Perez-Pena, A.P. Seeks to Rein in Sites Using its Content, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 7, 2009, at B1, availableat http:lwww.nytimes.com/2009/O4/O7/business/media/
07paper.html (describing plans of The Associated Press to sue search engines and aggregators
making use of Associated Press content); Posting of Neil Netanel (The Demise of Newspapers:
Economics, Copyright, Free Speech) to Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2008/O5/demiseof-newspapers-economics.html (May 5, 2008 14:47 EST) (stating that a copyright amendment to
make sure that aggregators make payments to newspapers may be necessary to preserve
reporting); Posting of Richard Posner (The Future of Newspapers) to The Becker-Posner Blog,
http://www.becker-posner-blog.com12009/06/the-future-of n.html (June 23, 2009, 19:37 CST)
("Expanding copyright law to bar online access to copyrighted materials without the copyright
holder's consent, or to bar linking to or paraphrasing copyrighted materials without the
copyright holder's consent, might be necessary to keep free riding on content financed by online
newspapers from so impairing the incentive to create costly news-gathering operations that news
services like Reuters and the Associated Press would become the only professional,
nongovernmental sources of news and opinion.").
15.
See New Zealand Herald, Google Slammed as "Parasites" of the Internet,
INDEPENDENT, Apr. 7, 2009, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/media/online/google-slammedas-parasites-of-the-internet-1664748.html (reporting statement by the Wall Street Journal
managing editor characterizing certain news aggregators as "parasites or tech tapeworms in the
intestines of the internet"); Mark G. Contreras, Senior Vice President/Newspapers, E.W. Scripps
Co., Statement Before the Federal Trade Commission, Workshop: "How Will News Media
Survive the Internet Age?" 3 (Dec. 1, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/workshops/news/
docs/contreras.PDF (stating, among other things, that newspapers need help licensing their
content); Rupert Murdoch, Chairman & CEO, News Corp., From Town Crier to Bloggers: How
Will Journalism Survive the Internet Age? 12-14 (Dec. 1, 2009), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/workshops/news/docs/murdoch.PDF
(describing behavior of news
aggregators as theft, saying that existing practices are "untenable" over the long run for the
production of valuable news, and emphasizing that news organizations must be paid for
producing content).
16.
Adam
Lashinsky,
Google
News,
FORTUNE,
Jan.
7,
2009,
http://money.cnn.com/2009/01/07/technology/lashinsky-google.fortune/.
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for content or otherwise help newspapers without a sound business
17
model-something that Google has yet to identify.
The application of the First Amendment to aggregation control
legislation is important because the First Amendment constrains what
Congress can do to help the newspaper industry. News aggregators
speak when they tell people about interesting stories, making
18
aggregation control legislation subject to First Amendment review.
This does not necessarily mean that such legislation is
unconstitutional. Copyright itself regulates speech, but courts have
consistently upheld copyright against First Amendment challenges. 19
At the same time, however, the Supreme Court has not given
Congress the freedom to pass whatever copyright legislation it wants.
In some cases, copyright legislation has been held unconstitutional
20
even though Congress passed it for entirely legitimate reasons.
Accordingly, some forms of aggregation control legislation may be
unconstitutional. It is therefore important to identify the extent to
which this proves true, for arguing about the desirability of legislation
makes little sense if courts will invalidate the legislation.
The analysis that follows shows that the aggregation control
legislation most likely to increase newspaper profits (called
"aggressive aggregation control") probably violates the First
Amendment. This may seem surprising given copyright's general
constitutionality. 21 Existing copyright, however, gives newspapers
only modest control over aggregation. 22 Thus, aggregation control
legislation will not really help newspapers unless it alters copyright to
prohibit people from linking or using headlines and lead sentences
without permission. These changes to copyright law would mean
converting public domain material into private property and reducing
the scope of fair use. Courts have already stated that such changes to
copyright would create First Amendment problems. 23 Accordingly, the

17.
Id.; see also Posting of Howard Knopf (News Aggregators as "Tapeworms') to Excess
Copyright,
http://excesscopyright.blogspot.com/2009/05/news-aggregators-as-tapeworms.html
(May 17, 2009, 16:23 EST) (arguing that use of copyright to control news aggregation is
"regressive" and would only prop up an outdated business model); Posting of David Kravetz
(Murdoch Calls Google, Yahoo Copyright Thieves-Is He Right?) to Threat Level,
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/04/murdoch-says-go/ (Apr. 3, 2009, 15:00 EST) ("We
suspect Zell and Murdoch are just blowing smoke. If they were not, perhaps they could demand
Google and Yahoo remove their news content. The search engines would kindly oblige.").
18.
See infra notes 63-89 and accompanying text

19.

Id.

20.
21.
22.
23.

See
See
See
See

infra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
infra notes 63-82 and accompanying text.
infra Part I.
infra notes 90-141 and accompanying text.
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First Amendment tells us that the expansion of copyright cannot by
itself fully address the problems facing the newspaper industry today.
As a result, other solutions will also have to be considered.
The Article proceeds in three parts. In Part I, it considers the
extent to which existing copyright law restricts the activity of news
aggregators. In Part II, it describes the contents of strong aggregation
control legislation and considers the extent to which such legislation
would survive First Amendment scrutiny, concluding that aggressive
aggregation control legislation would likely be found unconstitutional.
In Part III, the Article analyzes how Congress might craft
constitutional aggregation control legislation and whether such
legislation is truly important to the viability of newspapers. It
concludes that existing copyright gives newspapers sufficient rights to
open the door to mutually beneficial relationships with aggregators
that may preserve the economic viability of newspapers.
I. NEWS AGGREGATION AND COPYRIGHT

In order to understand how expanding copyright might help
keep the newspaper industry alive, it is necessary to first examine
how, if at all, existing copyright limits the behavior of news
aggregators. Section 102(a) of the Copyright Act extends copyright
protection to all "original works of authorship," 24 and the Supreme
Court has held that the standard of originality is low. 25 Once a work
gains copyright, the Copyright Act grants copyright holders only six
exclusive rights: the right to make copies, the right to make derivative
works, the right to initially distribute copies of the work, the right to
publicly perform the work, the right to publicly display the work, and
(for sound recordings) the right to digitally transmit the work. 26 The
Act also limits the rights of copyright holders by denying protection to
certain aspects of otherwise copyrighted works. 2 7 Accordingly, people
may freely copy those portions of works that lack sufficient
originality-such as short phrases and facts. 28 The Copyright Act
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
24.
See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (stating that
25.
the standard of originality is 'low" and easily satisfied); Am. Dental Ass'n v. Delta Dental Plans
Ass'n, 126 F.3d 977, 979 (7th Cir. 1997) (same); CCC Information Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter
Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 1994) (same).
26.

17 U.S.C. § 106(1)-(6) (2006).

27.
See id. § 102(b) (denying protection to, among other things, ideas contained in
works).
See Feist, 499 U.S. at 361-62, 364 (defendant's use of facts and unoriginal
28.
compilations of facts cannot be infringement); Perma Greetings, Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., Inc.,
598 F. Supp. 445, 448-49 (E.D. Mo. 1984) (defendant's use of short phrases not infringement).
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gives people a similar right to copy the ideas expressed in a work. 29 In
cases where context or other necessity renders a particular idea
capable of only a limited range of expression, the so-called merger
doctrine makes sure that the idea in question remains in the public
domain by allowing others to copy even the expression of these ideas. 30
Finally, in other cases, the fair use doctrine excuses behavior that
would otherwise be infringement. 31
Together, the rights that the Copyright Act extends give
newspapers the ability to control some, but not all, news aggregator
practices. For example, a news aggregator that posts a complete copy
of a newspaper article or a full size copy of a photograph on its website
surely commits infringement because these uses violate the copyright
holder's exclusive right to make and distribute copies of the work. At
the same time, however, aggregators do not necessarily infringe by
linking or the using headlines and lead sentences.
The copyright issues raised by linking are relatively
straightforward. Unauthorized linking to a copyrighted work does not
amount to infringement because linking does not involve copying,
distribution, or the use of any other right that the Copyright Act
expressly grants. 32 It is therefore highly unlikely that courts would
hold a news aggregator liable for infringement simply for linking to a
news article.
The copyright issues get a bit more complicated when one
considers the reproduction of headlines to give readers a sense of a
news article they may want to read.
Each of the limitations
mentioned above potentially comes into play. Headlines may lack
sufficient originality to support copyright. Even if they do, the merger
29.

17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (denying protection to ideas).
30.
See ATC Distrib. Group, Inc. v. Whatever It Takes Transmission & Parts, Inc., 402
F.3d 700, 707-08 (6th Cir. 2005) ("Under the merger doctrine, 'when there is essentially only one
way to express an idea, the idea and its expression are inseparable [i.e., they merge,] and
copyright is no bar to copying that expression."' (quoting Kohus v. Mariol, 328 F.3d 848, 856 (6th
Cir. 2003)) (alteration in original)); Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 705 (2d Cir. 1991)
("[E]xpression is not protected in those instances where there is only one or so few ways of
expressing an idea that protection of the expression would effectively accord protection to the
idea itself."); Kern River Gas Transmission Co. v. Coastal Corp., 899 F.2d 1458, 1463 (5th Cir.
1990) (stating that there is no copyright when idea and expression merge).
31.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (establishing fair use for certain uses of works, including
some uses for purposes of news reporting); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 58283 (1994) (defining fair use for parodic uses that do not supplant the market for copyrighted
original); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984) (defining
fair use for certain noncommercial reproduction of copyrighted works).
32.
Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.Com, Inc., No. CV 99-7654 HLH (BQRx), 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 4553, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2000) ("[H]yperlinking does not itself involve a
violation of the Copyright Act ... since no copying is involved.'); see also Mark Sableman, Link
Law Revisited: Internet Linking Law at Five Years, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1273, 1297 (2001).
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of idea and expression will sometimes prevent them from being
will probably excuse at
copyrighted.3 3 Finally, the fair use doctrine
34
least some aggregator use of headlines.
As noted earlier, copyright protects "original works of
36
authorship," 35 and it is easy for a work to qualify as original. Entire
news articles therefore easily gain copyright, but headlines frequently
do not because their brevity renders them unoriginal. In fact, courts
37
have a long history of denying copyright to short words and phrases.
For example, in Perma Greetings, Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., Inc., the
phrases "[a]long the way take time to smell the flowers" and "good
friends are hard to find" were denied copyright for want of
originality.3 8 Cases like this imply that ordinary headlines such as
"Red Sox Defeat Yankees" and "Obama Nominates Sotomayor" would
lack sufficient originality to merit copyright protection. Perhaps
courts would consider longer, more creative headlines like "Sox Sink
Slowly in September" original. Even so, the merger of idea and
expression and the fair use doctrine would shield the behavior of at
least some news aggregators.
To see how the merger of idea and expression affect the
copyrightability of even original headlines, consider the hypothetical
headline "Sox Sink Slowly in September." This cleverly expresses the
idea that the Red Sox are slowly losing ground (yet again!) in the
Copyright clearly does not protect ideas. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006). Instead, copyright
33.
protects only the original expression of ideas. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 101-104 (1880)
(distinguishing between the ideas and concepts expressed in a book that copyright does not
protect, and the explanation of those items that copyright does protect); Nichols v. Universal
Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (copyright does not protect a playwright's ideas,
only the expression of those ideas). The distinction between a work's ideas and their expression
is sometimes referred to as the idea/expression dichotomy. See Kregos, 937 F.2d at 707 (citing
Nichols and referring to the idea/expression dichotomy). As noted earlier, in some cases,
copyright still does not protect the expression of an idea if the idea is capable of only a limited
number of expressions. When this happens, the idea and its expression have merged, and courts
deny copyright protection to both the idea and its expression. See supra note 30 and
accompanying text.
See infra notes 41-59 and accompanying text.
34.
See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
35.
See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
36.
See Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 390 F.3d 276, 286-87 (3d Cir. 2004) (following
37.
practice of denying copyright to short phrases); CMM Cable Rep., Inc. v. Ocean Coast Props.,
Inc., 97 F.3d 1504, 1519 (1st Cir. 1996) ("It is axiomatic that copyright law denies protection to
'fragmentary words and phrases."' (quoting 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT § 2.01[B], at 2-13 to 2-18 (1995))); Alberto-Culver Co. v. Andrea Dumon, Inc., 466
F.2d 705, 711 (7th Cir. 1972) (denying copyright to phrase "most personal sort of deodorant");
Kitchens of Sara Lee, Inc. v. Nifty Foods Corp., 266 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir. 1959) (endorsing as a
"fair summary of the law" a Copyright Office regulation denying copyright and registration to
short phrases).
598 F. Supp. 445, 448-49 (E.D. Mo. 1984).
38.

VANDERBILT J. OFENT. AND TECH. LAW

[Vol. 12:4:947

American League East pennant race. In theory, people could express
this idea in countless ways, with each separate expression qualifying
for its own copyright. A person writing a headline, however, has very
limited space in which to express herself, and there are only a limited
number of ways to express the idea of the Sox losing the pennant race
in five words or fewer. If copyright allowed the monopolization of each
of these expressions, future headline writers could easily find
themselves in a situation where they could not express the idea
without risking infringement. This would mean effective ownership of
the underlying idea, an unacceptable result given that the Copyright
Act explicitly denies protection for ideas. 39 Courts would therefore
probably deny copyright to many headlines under the principle of
40
merger.
The availability of fair use to excuse potentially infringing uses
of headlines will likely depend on how courts define the market for
news articles. Under § 107 of the Copyright Act, fair use depends on
four factors: (1) the nature of the defendant's use, (2) the amount of
the borrowing, (3) the nature of the copyrighted work, and (4) the
effect of the use on the market for the copyrighted original. 41 The
leading case of Kelly v. Arriba Soft42 indicates that such a four-factor
test would shield the use of headlines to give potential readers a sense
of the news articles to which aggregators link.
In Kelly, the defendant Arriba Soft operated a search engine
that displayed so-called thumbnail images to users as search results. 43
Arriba Soft obtained those images by copying original, full-size images
from Internet sites and producing smaller, lower quality images for
display to users. Users who wanted to see full-size images then had to
click through to the original websites displaying the full-size images.
The plaintiff Kelly sued when Arriba Soft copied thirty-five images
from Kelly's website and used thumbnail versions as search results. 44
The District Court granted summary judgment for Arriba Soft, ruling

39.
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
40.
See supra note 30 and accompanying text. Interestingly, the influence of automated
search engines and news aggregation has led to the use of straightforward headlines of the sort
less likely to support copyright. See Steve Lohr, This Boring Headline is Written for Google, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 9, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/O4/09/weekinreview/O91ohr.html
(describing how search engines find stories with plain headlines more easily).
41.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
42.
336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003).
43.
Id. at 815.
44.
Id. at 815-16.
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that fair use protected its use of the thumbnail images. 45 The Ninth
46
Circuit affirmed.
With respect to factor one of the fair use analysis, the court
recognized that Arriba Soft used the copyrighted works for commercial
purposes, and that this weighed against fair use. 47 This did not mean,
however, that factor one counted against Arriba Soft. The court noted
that Arriba Soft's use, while commercial, actually enhanced access to
Kelly's images without supplanting the need for the originals. The
smaller, lower quality thumbnails only informed users about the
desirability of viewing the full size original. Users would not consider
the thumbnails as substitutes for the originals because the low quality
reproductions lacked too many details. This swung factor one in
48
Arriba Soft's favor.
The court then found that factor two favored Kelly because
This followed well-established
Kelly's works were creative. 49
precedent holding that the use of factual works is more likely to be fair
because facts are in the public domain and should be widely
disseminated.5 0 The court also noted that Kelly had already published
51
his works, a fact that counted somewhat in the defendant's favor.
52
This was not enough, however, to swing factor two for Arriba Soft.
Factor three came out neutral despite Arriba Soft's copying of
the entire images in question.5 3 Normally, such wholesale copying
would resolve factor three in Kelly's favor. 54 Here, however, the
particular purpose of the copying justified copying the entire image

45.
Id. at 816.
46.
Id. at 822. The court reversed the district court on the issue of whether fair use
shielded Arriba Soft's use of full-sized images and remanded for further consideration on this
issue alone. Id.
Id. at 818.
47.
48.
Id. at 818-20.
Id. at 820.
49.
See, e.g., Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 237 (1990) ("In general, fair use is more
50.
likely to be found in factual works than in fictional works."); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563 (1985) ('The law generally recognizes a greater need to
disseminate factual works than works of fiction or fantasy.");.
51.
Kelly, 336 F.3d at 820.
52.
Id.; see also Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564 (fair use more easily applies to uses of
published works than unpublished ones).
Kelly, 336 F.3d at 821.
53.
See, e.g., Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. County Sherriffs Dep't, 447 F.3d 769, 780 (9th Cir.
54.
2006) (verbatim copy of entire work weighs against fair use); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco
Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 925 (2d Cir. 1994) (copying of entire articles counted against finding of fair
use).
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because the images would be unrecognizable unless copied in their
entirety.5 5
The court finished its fair use analysis with the conclusion that
factor four favored Arriba Soft. 56 The opinion identified two primary
markets for Kelly's photos. These included attracting users to Kelly's
website where he sold advertisements, and selling or licensing Kelly's
photos for others' use. 57 Arriba Soft's use of Kelly's images did not
materially affect either market. The court wrote:
By showing the thumbnails on its results page when users entered terms related to
Kelly's images, the search engine would guide users to Kelly's web site [sic] rather than
away from it. Even if users were more interested in the image itself rather than the
information on the web page, they would still have to go to Kelly's site to see the fullsized image. The thumbnails would not be a substitute for the full-sized images because
the thumbnails lose their clarity when enlarged. If a user wanted to view or download a
quality image, he or she would have to visit Kelly's web site. This would hold true
whether the thumbnails are solely in Arriba's database or are more widespread and
found in other search engine databases.
Arriba's use of Kelly's images also would not harm Kelly's ability to sell or license his
full-sized images. Arriba does not sell or license its thumbnails to other parties.
Anyone who downloaded the thumbnails would not be successful selling full-sized
images enlarged from the thumbnails because of the low resolution of the thumbnails.
There would be no way to view, create, or sell a clear, full-sized image without going to
58
Kelly's web sites.

In some ways, the case for shielding aggregator use of
headlines as fair use is stronger than the case for shielding search
engine use of thumbnails. Aggregators use headlines in the same way
that search engines use thumbnails-namely, to give people a sense of
whether they would like to look at something in more detail.
Headlines are generally factual in nature, making them particularly
good candidates for fair use treatment. 59 Additionally, headlines
comprise only small parts of news articles, while thumbnails
reproduce entire images. Finally, readers are unlikely to consider
headlines as a substitute for an entire article, making the effect on the
market for the copyrighted original small.
There is, however, a wrinkle. Although readers are the obvious
market for copyrighted news articles, one could argue that potential
advertisers comprise the true market. After all, newspapers sell their
content as vehicles for attracting viewers of advertisements. To the
55.

Id.

56.
Id. at 821-22.
57.
Id. at 821.
58.
Id. at 821-22. More recently, the Ninth Circuit reached a similar conclusion with
respect to Google's use of thumbnails as part of its image search function. See Perfect 10, Inc. v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 719-25 (9th Cir. 2007).
59.
See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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extent that publication of headlines allows news aggregators to lure
away advertisers who would otherwise pay to advertise on newspaper
sites, the effect on the market for the copyrighted work may be strong
enough to warrant denial of fair use. That said, one should be careful
about considering such "substitution" to be determinative of fair use.
Ordinary search engines attract advertisements by displaying search
results that convey the substance of copyrightable web pages that
might otherwise gain such revenue themselves. Courts have not
60
shown an inclination to treat search engines as mass infringers.
Thus, at the very least, it seems likely, but not certain, that courts
would use fair use to shield at least some instances of news
aggregation.
The same doctrines that governed aggregator use of headlines
also govern aggregators' use of lead sentences. Here, however, courts
likely will find lead sentences copyrightable. Lead sentences are
probably original because they are longer than headlines. Courts
would therefore be much less likely to deny copyright to lead
sentences than to headlines because it would be hard to call lead
sentences short phrases. Moreover, although lead sentences often
express ideas in a brief, focused way, the range of possible
constructions for lead sentences is probably larger than for headlines,
making it unlikely that a court would deny copyright because the idea
and expression had merged. Fair use, however, remains a distinct
possibility. As was the case for headlines, an aggregator's use of a
lead sentence is comparable to the use of a thumbnail. The nature of
the original copyrighted work remains factual, and the amount
borrowed is small. Finally, it is still quite unlikely that readers
consider a lead sentence a full substitute for the original. Aggregators
will therefore find protection, if at all, under the fair use doctrine.

II. A FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS OF AGGREGATION CONTROL
LEGISLATION

Copyright does not give newspapers reliable protection against
every instance of aggregation.
Although in some instances
newspapers could successfully sue aggregators for infringement, in
others, newspapers would fail.
Accordingly, aggregation control
legislation would help newspapers only by aggressively closing gaps in
existing copyright law. This would include: (1) defining newspaper

60.
See Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007) (preliminary
injunction against Google vacated even though the search engine made use of plaintiffs
copyrighted images).
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headlines and lead sentences as copyrightable subject matter even if
they lack originality or represent the merger of idea and expression,
(2) curtailing the scope of fair use, 61 and (3) treating links as a form of
infringement. 62 Together, these changes would effectively make news
aggregation illegal without the consent of newspapers whose articles
get aggregated.
A First Amendment analysis of such legislation starts with the
relationship between copyright and free speech. At first inspection,
copyright seems to conflict with the First Amendment's command that
Congress shall make "no law" abridging freedom of speech. 63 Courts
64
generally treat the reproduction and distribution of texts as speech,
so the Copyright Act clearly infringes speech by preventing the
65
unauthorized copying and distribution of copyrighted works.
What, then, keeps copyright from violating the First
Amendment? The Supreme Court has drawn attention to two features
of copyright to answer this question. First, copyright acts as an
incentive for the production of speech by permitting commercial
61.
See Perez-Pena, supra note 14 (describing efforts to force aggregators to pay for
using headlines and small amounts of text and stating that news organizations have been
reluctant to bring copyright suits for fear of losing on grounds of fair use).
62.
See Posner, supra note 14 (suggesting expansion of copyright "to bar linking to or
paraphrasing copyrighted materials without the copyright holder's consent" in order to protect
news industry).
63.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
64.
See Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (applying First Amendment to
prevent injunction stopping press from publishing accounts of confessions to law enforcement);
N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (First Amendment protects publication of
classified study "History of U.S. Decision-Making Process on Viet Nam Policy").
65.
See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (granting authors exclusive right to reproduction and
distribution of copyrighted works); 17 U.S.C. § 502 (providing injunctive relief against
infringers). For articles analyzing the conflict between copyright and the First Amendment, see
DAVID L. LANGE & H. JEFFERSON POWELL, No LAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE IMAGE OF
AN ABSOLUTE FIRST AMENDMENT (2009); C. Edwin Baker, FirstAmendment Limits on Copyright,
55 VAND. L. REV. 891 (2002); Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: FirstAmendment
Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999); Robert C.
Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech: ConstitutionalLimitations on the Protection of Expression,
67 CAL. L. REV. 283 (1979); Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L.
REV. 983 (1970); Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in
Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (1998); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating
Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2001); Melville B. Nimmer,
Does Copyright Abridge the FirstAmendment Guaranteesof Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L.
REV. 1180 (1970); L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1
(1987); Pamela Samuelson, Reviving Zacchini: Analyzing First Amendment Defenses in Right of
Publicity and Copyright Cases, 57 TUL. L. REV. 836 (1983); Lionel S. Sobel, Copyright and the
First Amendment: A Gathering Storm?, 19 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 43 (1971); Alfred C.
Yen, A First Amendment Perspective on the Idea/Expression Dichotomy and Copyright in a
Work's 'Total Concept and Feel", 38 EMORY L.J. 393 (1989); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman,
Information as Speech, Information as Goods: Some Thoughts on Marketplaces and the Bill of
Rights, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 665 (1992).

2010]

NEWS AGGREGATION AS COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT

961

exploitation of that speech. 66 Second, doctrines like originality, the
idea/expression dichotomy, and fair use guarantee many free uses of
copyrighted works. 67 This lessens copyright's impact on free speech,
allowing copyright's pro-speech incentives to outweigh its restrictions
on speech. Two Supreme Court cases, Harper & Row v. The Nation
Enterprises, Inc.68 and Eldred v. Ashcroft, 69 establish this
understanding of copyright and the First Amendment.
In Harper, the Court considered a dispute arising from
defendant The Nation's publication of an article about former
President Gerald Ford's memoir A Time to Heal: The Autobiography of
Gerald R. Ford.70 Harper & Row, the memoir's publisher, promoted
the book by arranging for Time magazine to publish excerpts before
the public could buy the book. In the days leading up to public sale of
A Time to Heal, The Nation's editor, Victor Navasky, obtained a copy
of Ford's book from an unauthorized source. This enabled The Nation
to publish an article that summarized portions of the book and quoted
some of Ford's language. Time subsequently canceled its contract for
early publication of excerpts. Harper & Row then sued The Nation for
71
copyright infringement.
Harper is famous for applying the fair use doctrine. For
purposes of this Article, however, particular attention must be paid to
The Nation's assertion that the First Amendment required a ruling in
its favor. The Nation claimed that the public's interest in reading a
former president's exact words outweighed any copyright-based right
to control the book's first publication. 72 The Supreme Court rejected
this argument and stated that doctrines like the idea/expression
dichotomy and the fair use doctrine ameliorated potential conflicts
between copyright and the First Amendment. According to the Court,
these doctrines allowed the public to make free use of certain portions
of works while reserving to authors sufficient rights to encourage
speech. 73 The Court wrote, "In our haste to disseminate news, it
should not be forgotten that the Framers intended copyright itself to
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

See
See
471
537
471

71.

Id.

72.

infra note 73 and accompanying text.
infra notes 73-82 and accompanying text.
U.S. 539 (1985).
U.S. 186 (2003).
U.S. at 542-43.

Id. at 555-56.
Id. at 556 (endorsing statement by Second Circuit that the idea/expression
dichotomy "'[strikes] a definitional balance between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act
by permitting free communication of facts while still protecting an author's expression' " (quoting
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 203 (2d Cir. 1983)) (alteration in
original)).

73.
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be the engine of free expression. By establishing a marketable right to
the use of one's expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive
to create and disseminate ideas. '74 This economic incentive justified
copyright's effects on free speech, especially when the idea/expression
dichotomy and fair use keep copyright's effects on speech reasonably
75
small.
The Supreme Court further elaborated on the relationship
between copyright and the First Amendment in Eldred v. Ashcroft,76 a
case that laid the framework for how courts should assess copyright
legislation under the First Amendment. In Eldred, the plaintiff
challenged the constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension Act
(CTEA), a piece of legislation that added twenty years to the duration
of all existing and prospective copyrights 7 7 The plaintiff contended
that the CTEA was a content-neutral regulation of speech that could
not survive the elevated scrutiny that the First Amendment
requires.78
The Court disagreed, however, and applied the less
exacting rational basis test to the CTEA. 79 This led to the conclusion
80
that the CTEA did not violate the First Amendment.
Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion drew heavily upon Harper.
She repeated Harper's observations that copyright promotes speech
and that the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use keep copyright
from unduly restricting speech:
In addition to spurring the creation and publication of new expression, copyright law
contains built-in First Amendment accommodations. First, it distinguishes between
ideas and expression and makes only the latter eligible for copyright protection.... As
we said in Harper & Row, this "idea/expression dichotomy strike[s] a definitional
balance between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free
communication of facts while still protecting an author's expression." Due to this
distinction, every idea, theory, and fact in a copyrighted work becomes instantly
available for public exploitation at the moment of publication.

74.
Id. at 558.
75.
Id. at 560. The Court stated that,
In view of the First Amendment protections already embodied in the Copyright Act's
ditinction between copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable facts and ideas, and
the latitude for scholarship and comment traditionally afforded by fair use, we see no
warrant for expanding the doctrine of fair use to create what amounts to a public
figure exception to copyright.
Id.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

537 U.S. 186 (2003).
Id. at 192-93.
Id. at 193-94.
Id. at 213 (discussing rational basis for the CTEA).
Id. at 222.
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Second, the "fair use" defense allows the public to use not only facts and ideas
contained
81
in a copyrighted work, but also expression itself in certain circumstances.

This did not mean, however, that Congress had complete freedom to
rewrite copyright as it pleased. To the contrary, copyright legislation
could escape more searching First Amendment scrutiny only if
"Congress has not altered the traditional contours of copyright
8' 2
protection.
Unfortunately, Justice Ginsburg did not define what it means
to alter the traditional contours of copyright. However, it seems that
an understanding of the traditional contours ought to include longstanding doctrines that limit the scope of copyright because those are
the very limits that allow copyright's incentives to outweigh its
restriction on speech.
For example, consider the effect of eliminating or significantly
weakening the idea/expression dichotomy. Copyright leaves ideas in
83
the public domain so that people may use ideas as they see fit.
Protecting ideas would shrink the public domain, decreasing the free
use of ideas and, by extension, diminishing free speech. This would
upset the balance between copyright's incentives and restrictions on
speech. It is, of course, theoretically possible that any given increase
in the scope of copyright might encourage more speech than it
suppresses, but this does not mean that courts should merely accept
such a possibility under a rational basis test. As the Supreme Court
suggested in Eldred, courts should apply elevated scrutiny to such a
change in copyright's traditional contours in order to make sure that
84
copyright's incentives still justify its restrictions on speech.
Brief reflection reveals further traditional contours that
Congress should not be able to alter without exposing copyright to
elevated scrutiny. Weakening or eliminating fair use would restrict
speech in ways that the Eldred Court considered important to the
copyright/First Amendment balance.8 5
Additionally, extending
copyright protection to unoriginal material would have an effect

81.
Id. at 219 (citations omitted).
82.
Id. at 221.
83.
Id. at 219. The Court stated:
As we said in Harper & Row, this "idea/expression dichotomy strikes a definitional
balance between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free
communication of facts while still protecting an author's expression." Due to this
distinction, every idea, theory, and fact in a copyrighted work becomes instantly
available for public exploitation at the moment of publication.
Id. (citation omitted).
84.
See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
85.
See 537 U.S. at 219-200 (discussing the importance of fair use to copyright/First
Amendment balance).
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similar to the elimination or weakening of the idea/expression
dichotomy. People presently have the freedom to use unoriginal
material in the same manner as ideas because both are in the public
domain. 86 Extending copyright protection to unoriginal material
would therefore burden speech just as eliminating or weakening the
idea/expression dichotomy would.8 7 Finally, consider what would
happen if Congress began adding entirely new substantive rights to
copyright. Each of those new rights would prohibit free uses of works
that people presently enjoy, uses that would otherwise be considered
88
free speech.
Aggressive aggregation control legislation would therefore alter
the traditional contours of copyright in ways that require elevated
First Amendment scrutiny. Making newspaper headlines and lead
sentences copyrightable subject matter would push copyright beyond
the boundaries that the idea/expression dichotomy and originality set.
Prohibiting linking would be the equivalent of adding a new
substantive right to copyright, and it would shrink the scope of fair
use. Given the Eldred Court's clear statement about the relationship
between copyright and the First Amendment, a court could not apply
the rational basis test to our hypothesized legislation without
overlooking its responsibility to make sure that copyright's
encouragement of speech outweighs its suppression of speech.8 9
So what would the application of elevated scrutiny to copyright
involve? Two cases, Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Federal
Communications Commission90 and Golan v. Holder,91 offer important
86.

See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.

87.
See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991) ("Originality
is a constitutional requirement.").
88.
See Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1187-92 (10th Cir. 2007) (applying elevated
scrutiny to copyright legislation removing works from the public domain).
89.
Not every court has applied elevated scrutiny to copyright legislation in the wake of
Eldred. Most notably, in Kahle v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 697 (9th Cir. 2007), the Ninth Circuit
applied a deferential standard of review to aspects of the CTEA that allowed copyright holders to
maintain their copyrights without complying with various statutory formalities. Id. at 698-700.
The court refused to apply elevated scrutiny on the ground that the Supreme Court had already
found the CTEA constitutional in Eldred. Id. at 700. Kahle has relatively little to say about when
a court should apply elevated First Amendment scrutiny to copyright legislation because the
Ninth Circuit saw the case as an attempt to re-litigate Eldred. It would therefore be incorrect to
read Kahle as standing for the proposition that all First Amendment review of copyright
legislation should be deferential. For contrasting analyses of this question, see David S. Olson,
First Amendment Interests and Copyright Accommodations, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1393 (2009) (arguing
that there are many situations in which courts should apply elevated First Amendment
scrutiny); Marybeth Peters, ConstitutionalChallenges to Copyright Law, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS
509 (2007) (arguing that courts are properly unwilling to use the First Amendment to invalidate
copyright legislation).
90.
520 U.S. 180 (1997).
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clues. Turner involved a First Amendment challenge to the "mustcarry" provisions of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992 that required cable television operators to
dedicate some of their channels to the signals of conventional
broadcast channels. 92 The plaintiffs sued, complaining that forcing
cable network operators to carry the signals of conventional
broadcasters violated the First Amendment rights of cable network
operators. 93 The Court rejected this challenge. 94
The Court began its analysis by characterizing the must-carry
provisions as a content-neutral, as opposed to content-based,
regulation of speech, thereby controlling the level of scrutiny that the
Court would apply to the statute. 95
Content-based regulation
suppresses speech because of the ideas that the speech in question
expresses, 96 whereas content-neutral regulation suppresses speech
without reference to the ideas contained in the speech. 97 Thus, a law
prohibiting speech advocating the legalization of gay marriage would
be content-based because it suppresses only speech expressing a
particular point of view. Content-neutral regulation includes laws
prohibiting burning of draft cards and reasonable regulations
governing the use of parks, even if those regulations prevent speech
activities. 98 Courts apply strict scrutiny to content-based regulations
because they amount to censorship favoring some ideas over others. 99
It makes sense to find these regulations unconstitutional absent
compelling justification from the government.
Content-neutral
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

611 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (D. Colo. 2009).
520 U.S. at 185.
Id. at 185-86.
Id. at 185.
Id. at 189.
96.
See United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 811-12 (2000)
(statute found content-based because it suppressed certain speech on the basis of its content);
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1992) (government may not proscribe speech
because it disapproves of the ideas expressed); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 329-30 (1988) (law
prohibiting display of any sign within 500 feet of a foreign embassy if sign is critical or offensive
to that foreign government is content-based regulation).
97.
See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986) (content-neutral
speech regulations are justified without reference to the content of the speech).
98.
See Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 325 (2002) (upholding permit
requirement for use of park); Clark v. Cmty for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 289 (1984)
(upholding restrictions on sleeping in park even though demonstrators wanted to draw attention
to plight of the homeless by sleeping in a public park); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367
(1968) (law prohibiting burning of draft card upheld against challenge from individual burning
draft card in protest).
99.
See Playboy Entm't Group, 529 U.S. at 813 (content-based restriction must satisfy
strict scrutiny); Boos, 485 U.S. at 321-22 (content-based regulation subject to "most exacting"
scrutiny).
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regulations, however, pose less obvious threats to speech. Park use
regulations do not favor some ideas over others; they merely promote
the orderly use of public resources. The lower threat to free speech
associated with content-neutral regulation justifies less searching
constitutional review. This level of review is not cursory, but falls in
between the deferential methods of the rational basis test and the
practical guarantee of unconstitutionality associated with strict
scrutiny. 100 Accordingly, courts will find a content-neutral regulation
constitutional "if it advances important governmental interests
unrelated to the suppression of free speech and does not burden
substantially more speech than necessary to further those
interests."10 1
In Turner, the important governmental interest at stake was
the economic health of the conventional broadcast industry. 10 2 The
Court wrote:
Congress expressed clear concern that the "marked shift in market share from broadcast
television to cable television services," resulting from increasing market penetration by
cable services, as well as the expanding horizontal concentration and vertical
integration of cable operators, combined to give cable systems the incentive and ability
to delete, reposition, or decline carriage to local broadcasters in an attempt to favor
affiliated cable programmers. Congress predicted that "absent the reimposition of
[must-carry], additional local broadcast signals will be deleted, repositioned, or not
carried," with the end result that "the economic viability of free local broadcast
its ability to originate quality local programming will be seriously
television and
10 3
jeopardized."

Keeping conventional broadcasters healthy served three interrelated
interests: preserving the benefits of free, over-the-air broadcasting;
encouraging the broad distribution of information from multiple
10 4
sources; and promoting fair competition in television programming.
After lengthy analysis, the Court accepted the government's claim
10 5
that the must-carry rules served these purposes.
Next, the Court found that the must-carry provisions served
The Court
this interest without undue burdens on speech.106
identified two ways in which must-carry might infringe the free
100.
See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 548 (2001) (referring to the "often fatal
standard of strict scrutiny"); Lyng v. Int'l Union, 485 U.S. 360, 370 (1988) (rational basis test of
legislation is "quite deferential").
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 520 U.S. 180, 189 (1997).
101.
102.
Id. at 189-90.
Id. at 191.
103.
Id. at 189.
104.
105.
Id. at 190-213.
Id. at 215-16 ("Because the burden imposed by must-carry is congruent to the
106.
benefits it affords, we conclude must-carry is narrowly tailored to preserve a multiplicity of
broadcast stations.").
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speech of cable operators. 10 7 First, it might interfere with their
editorial discretion in deciding what programming to carry.108 Second,
the reduction in available channels might impair the ability of cable
operators to compete for future carriage. 10 9 Neither of these burdens
proved significant. 110
Cable operators satisfied the must-carry
provisions by using unused channel capacity 87 percent of the time. 1
Very few operators had to drop programming in order satisfy mustcarry, and only 1.18 percent of cable channel capacity was directed to
must-carry nationwide.1 121ndeed, cable operators voluntarily carried
most conventional over-the-air channels. 113 Although the plaintiffs
suggested potentially less restrictive methods for achieving the
purposes of must-carry, the Court chose not to second-guess Congress'
judgment about how to regulate the cable television industry because
of the relatively modest speech burdens imposed by the must-carry

provisions. 114
Golan v. Holder"1 5 involved, among other things, a First
Amendment challenge to the constitutionality of § 514 of the Uruguay
Round Agreements Act, 116 now codified at 17 U.S.C. § 104A.1 1 7 This
provision implemented certain portions of the Berne Convention 11 8 by
granting copyright to certain works written by foreign authors after
those works had fallen into the public domain. 119 The plaintiffs sued
the U.S. government to complain that § 514 deprived them of their
20
right to use these works freely and without charge.1
The District Court originally granted summary judgment to the
Government. 121 In so ruling, the District Court relied on cases-

107.

Id. at 214.

108.
109.

Id.
Id.

110.
Id. ("Appellants say the burden of must-carry is great, but the evidence adduced on
remand indicates the actual effects are modest.").

111.
112.

Id.
Id.

113.
Id. at 215.
114.
Id. at 215-16 ("Because the burden imposed by must-carry is congruent to the
benefits it affords, we conclude must-carry is narrowly tailored.').
115.
611 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (D. Colo. 2009).
116.
Id. at 1167.
117.
17 U.S.C. § 104A (2006).
118.
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, adopted Sept. 9,
1886, S.Treaty Doc. No. 99-27, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3.
119.
Holder, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1168.

120.

Id.

121.
Id.; Golan v. Gonzales, No. Civ.01-B-1854(BNB), 2005 WL 914754, at *17 (D. Colo.
Apr. 20, 2005).
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including Eldred122-that considered copyright generally consistent
with the First Amendment. 123 The court then applied a rational basis
124
test to § 514 and unsurprisingly found it constitutional.
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded. 125 Unlike the
District Court, the Tenth Circuit found that Congress did not
traditionally remove material, particularly entire works, from the
public domain. 126 This meant that § 514 changed the traditional
contours by granting copyright to certain foreign works already in the
public domain. 12 7 Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit sent the case back to
the District Court with instructions to review § 514 under elevated
128
scrutiny.
On remand, the District Court applied elevated scrutiny to §
514 and found the provision unconstitutional. 129 The court first found
that § 514 was content-neutral because the law selected speech for
suppression simply because the speech made unauthorized use of
30
certain copyrighted works, and not because of the ideas expressed.1
The court then considered three proffered reasons for the law: (1)
compliance with treaty obligations under the Berne Convention, (2)
protection for the interests of U.S. authors abroad, and (3) correction
of historical inequities. 3 None proved sufficient for the statute to
pass constitutional muster.
The court agreed that the United States had to live up to its
treaty obligations, but this did not obviate the need to balance the
government's interest against the First Amendment rights of the
plaintiffs.13 2 In this case, the restoration of copyright to works
previously in the public domain burdened rights "near the core of the
First Amendment."' 133 Section 514 contained some minor exceptions
that marginally decreased its burden on speech, but the court did not
consider these to be at all significant. 134 The court then noted that the
government actually had considerable discretion about how it chose to

122.
123.
124.
125.

Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
Gonzales, 2005 WL 914754 at *17.
Id. at *15-*18.
Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1182 (10th Cir. 2007).

126.

Id. at 1188-92.

127.

Id. at 1192.

128.

Id. at 1196-97.

129.

Golan v. Holder, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1170-77 (D.Colo. 2009).

130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

134.

Id. (finding that the amount of speech subject to suppression is substantial).

1170.
1172.
1172-73.
1173.
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implement its treaty obligations. 135 For example, the government
could have given those most affected by § 514 extended rights to make
free use of works being removed from the public domain. 136 The
decision not to do so meant that § 514 was substantially broader than
necessary to serve the government's interest.1 37 The remaining
The court found that the
justifications fared even less well.
government did not present sufficient evidence to support the
conclusion that § 514 would actually protect the interests of U.S.
authors abroad. 138 Moreover, the court decided that § 514 actually
39
created inequities rather than correcting them.
Turner and Golan stand on opposite sides of the line between
Mustpermissible and impermissible content-neutral legislation.
of its
because
scrutiny
carry survived intermediate First Amendment
modest, well-targeted impact on speech, while the extension of
copyright to public domain works failed because it deprived people of
significant free speech rights more broadly than reasonably necessary
The differences
to accomplish a legitimate government purpose.
between Turner and Golan imply that Congress is not free to pass
whatever aggregation control legislation it desires. Turner allowed
the government to help conventional television broadcasters at the
expense of cable operators. This means that the government could, at
least in theory, act to help newspapers at the expense of news
aggregators. There are, however, significant differences between the
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992
and aggressive aggregation control legislation, differences that push
such legislation over to the Golan side of the line.
First, must-carry provisions burdened speech by asking cable
1 40
operators to disseminate the speech of others alongside their own.
Aggregation control operates differently because it prohibits
aggregators from distributing their own speech, particularly
information about news articles and where they may be read.
Moreover, aggregation control legislation would extend copyright to
ideas and unoriginal material, material already in the public domain.
This resembles the propertization of public domain material that the
Golan court found unconstitutional.

135.
136.

Id. at 1174.
Id.

137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 1175.
Id.at 1175-76.
Id. at 1177.
See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
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Second, the must-carry provisions barely disturbed the speech
of cable operators. Cable operators rarely had to drop programming in
order to carry conventional broadcasters' signals, and cable operators
generally carried those signals voluntarily.141
By contrast, the
suggested restriction on news aggregation greatly interferes with the
free speech of aggregators. It would force aggregators to drop their
preferred programming, i.e., information about news articles,
something aggregators would not do voluntarily.
Third, must-carry had the primary effect of increasing the
amount of information available to the public, while restricting news
aggregators does not have such an effect. The mandatory carriage of
conventional television on cable meant that people had more ways to
view more channels. Using copyright to restrict news aggregators has
precisely the opposite effect because restrictions on aggregators mean
that the public will have fewer ways to discover, learn about, and read
news articles.
Finally, must-carry rules survived First Amendment review in
large part because the government limited their applicability to the
very speakers (cable operators) whose behavior might threaten
conventional broadcasters. 142
This helped the Turner Court to
conclude that must-carry did not burden substantially more speech
than necessary. 143 By contrast, the general propertization of headlines
and lead sentences will affect many speakers other than the
aggregators who might threaten the newspaper industry. Bloggers,
search engines, and even libraries would become liable for using web
pages to inform readers about the general content of even a single
news article and linking to it. It is highly unlikely that restricting this
sort of speech would help the newspaper industry, and indeed it would
likely harm the overall quantity and quality of speech generally.
The Turner and Golan holdings show that Congress does not
have a free hand to fashion whatever aggregation control legislation it
desires. Using copyright to increase the rights of newspapers changes
the traditional contours of copyright, thereby exposing aggregation
141.
See supra notes 112-113 and accompanying text.
142.
Turner Broad. Sys. v. F.C.C., 520 U.S. 180, 185 (1997) (stating that cable television
systems, not others, must carry local broadcast signals); id. at 209-13 (Congress had sufficient
evidence to conclude that the expansion of cable television threatened traditional broadcasters).
143.
See id. at 215-16 (burden of must-carry is appropriate to its benefits). The Turner
Court did not state that the class of those burdened by must-carry provisions was narrowly
tailored. Nevertheless, the outcome of the case probably would have been different if Congress
had placed responsibility for carrying conventional broadcast signals on those other than cable
operators. Doing so would have burdened the speech of many whose behavior did not injure

conventional broadcasters with no countervailing public benefit. This would likely have tipped
the case against the constitutionality of must-carry rules.
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Such
control legislation to elevated First Amendment scrutiny.
scrutiny need not be fatal; however, the extension of copyright to
public domain material and the weakening of fair use create serious
burdens on speech that affect many speakers whose behavior is not
well-connected to the goal of protecting newspapers from the effects of
news aggregation. Accordingly, courts should find unconstitutional
the aggressive aggregation control legislation of the sort described
here.

III. COPYRIGHT AND AGGREGATION CONTROL IN LIGHT OF THE
FIRST AMENDMENT

The unconstitutionality of aggressive aggregation control
provides a backdrop against which to consider the future of news
aggregation and the revenues of newspapers. Consider first the First
Amendment limits on what aggregation control legislation will likely
accomplish. Aggressive aggregation control may be unconstitutional,
but Congress could theoretically pass less restrictive forms of
aggregation control that would survive a constitutional challenge. For
example, Congress might limit the parties to whom aggregation
control would apply. Perhaps only news aggregators (however they
are defined) would be prevented from using headlines and linking. Or
perhaps Congress could restrict the duration of the prohibition against
linking to a twenty-four-hour period after the news article in question
is first published. Congress might also limit the remedy for news
aggregation. Copyright ordinarily allows a successful plaintiff to
recover compensatory damages or presumed statutory damages in
144
addition to an injunction against the infringing activity.
Eliminating injunctive relief and putting a cap on the amount of
damages would obviously shrink the effect of aggregation control on
speech. This could even take the form of legislatively mandated
compulsory licensing that supports a system of micropayments from
145
aggregators to newspapers.
Taken individually or together, these possibilities would reduce
the conflict between aggregation control legislation and the First
Amendment. It is entirely possible, but not certain, that these limits
would enable aggregation control to pass constitutional muster.
Unfortunately, such legislation might not be worth passing because

144.

17 U.S.C. §§ 502, 504 (2006) (providing for recovery of damages and injunctive relief

in copyright cases).
145.
See Netanel, supra note 14 (considering possibility that making aggregators pay for
content is the only way to preserve reporting).
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the suggested limits would probably still allow a significant amount of
news aggregation to continue. Even if news aggregators could be
defined with sufficient clarity to avoid First Amendment vagueness
and overbreadth problems, those identified as aggregators would
resume aggregating after the twenty-four-hour restriction expires.
Indeed, if aggregation were sufficiently profitable, aggregators might
happily pay the required damages to continue aggregating before the
expiration of restrictions. 146 To be sure, limited aggregation control
legislation would probably be of economic value to newspapers. That
value might not be enough, however, to keep newspapers sufficiently
profitable. And, of course, if Congress tries to strengthen aggregation
control to ensure newspaper profits, the chances of unconstitutionality
would rise.
The problems identified here imply that newspapers, and
indeed society, cannot rely on legislative changes to copyright as the
comprehensive solution for maintaining the health of the newspaper
industry. All is not lost, however. Even though existing copyright law
does not prohibit all instances of news aggregation, 147 it does provide
leverage against many aggregators because almost every aggregator
will eventually infringe. This leverage, along with incentives based on
rights that newspapers clearly own, creates conditions ripe for
commercial arrangements that benefit both newspapers and
aggregators.
For example, some aggregators use automated processes to
select and display articles for aggregation. 148 It is highly unlikely that
any automated process can accurately avoid reproducing the
admittedly unusual headline that is copyrightable or ensuring that all
uses of lead sentences stay within fair use. Even aggregators that use
humans for aggregation cannot guarantee that infringement will not
happen. In many cases, the humans themselves are not likely to be
well-trained in copyright law, and in still others the proper application
will not be apparent. Thus, simply by the law of large numbers, every
aggregator will eventually commit infringement, thereby offering
newspapers the opportunity to sue.
Of course, the damages available from this kind of suit would
be far smaller than the damages that newspapers believe aggregation
causes, and it is not clear whether a court would enjoin a defendant

146.
Indeed, it might be socially valuable for aggregators to do this on the theory that
their willingness to pay reflects the social utility of aggregation.
147.
See supra Part I.
148.
See supranote 10 and accompanying text.

2010]

NEWS AGGREGATION AS COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT

973

149
from aggregating simply because the defendant occasionally errs.
Nevertheless, it is likely that enough instances of infringement could
be lumped together to create the threat of meaningful damages, and it
remains possible that a court would issue an injunction against
aggregation. In short, the suit suggested here would at least get a
news aggregator's attention and trigger serious settlement
discussions. Neither party will want to risk the consequences of an
adverse judgment because it could effectively destroy aggregation as a
business or seriously damage newspapers' hopes for gaining revenue
from aggregators. This is where a newspaper can offer something to
induce aggregators to pay fees for aggregating.
It is important to remember that aggregators operate in a
highly competitive market where others can easily replicate the basic
content that they offer. Aggregators that want to attract and keep
readers must therefore offer something valuable that its competitors
cannot. Obviously, effective choice and classification of aggregated
articles accomplish this, as would prompt summaries of articles and
audio-visual content that bring a website to life. A newspaper can
offer aggregators that settle on favorable terms the added benefit of
these very advantages.
For example, a newspaper could offer
immediate access to news stories before they appear on the Internet,
allowing the aggregator to produce content earlier than its rivals.
This could be particularly valuable in areas like financial news, where
the ability to respond to information quickly is valued. Similarly, a
newspaper could offer licensing for images, videos, podcasts, or even
entire articles that complement the news. A newspaper might even
offer to make its content available to aggregators in a form that made
aggregation easier and more effective. Again, an aggregator getting
access to this would have a competitive advantage over rivals, and
newspapers could cement that advantage by suing aggregators that
use the copyrighted audio-visual content without permission.
It is easy to see how aggregators might find it attractive to pay
some amount (perhaps a reasonable percentage of advertising
revenue) in exchange for these benefits and the freedom to aggregate
without fear of suit. Indeed, a truly enlightened aggregator should
realize that some support for the news industry is a good idea because,
without news gathering, there is nothing to aggregate. It is likely that
such arrangements have already begun. In 2006, Agence FrancePresse (AFP) sued Google, contending that Google's news aggregation
infringed AFP's copyrights. Google settled that case on terms that

149.
See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (finding that injunctive
relief should not be automatic in patent cases).
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"will enable the use of AFP's newswire content in innovative, new
ways that will dramatically improve newswire content on the
Internet."'15 0 Google also entered into a similar arrangement with the
Associated Press, as did Yahoo. 151 More recently, the Associated Press
has conducted intense negotiations with Google and Yahoo for new,
and presumably more comprehensive, agreements of this nature. 152
Without question, the expense of filing a suit and conducting
negotiations might prevent agreements between all newspapers and
all aggregators, but newspapers could probably negotiate successfully
with the major aggregators if they really cared to do so. This leaves
open the possibility, if not the likelihood, that the absence of
aggregation control legislation will not stop society from enjoying the
benefits of news aggregation while preserving the economic viability of
newspapers or other news gathering organizations.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has offered a preliminary analysis of aggressive
aggregation control and the First Amendment. For better or worse, a
significant portion of the commentary about aggregation control calls
for such legislation without considering the issues raised here. This is
unfortunate because aggregation control imposes serious burdens on
free speech that courts cannot ignore by repeating the conventional
refrain that copyright is consistent with the First Amendment.
Indeed, it is quite likely that the First Amendment significantly
reduces the usefulness of aggregation control legislation to ensure the
health of newspapers.
Fortunately, as this Article has shown,
newspapers and newsgathering will not necessarily disappear.
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Existing copyright can, without violating the First Amendment, still
provide sufficient leverage for newspapers to negotiate arrangements
to share the revenue generated by news aggregators. Of course, this
does not mean that newspapers will be as profitable as they once were
or that newsgathering will remain as large a business as it is today.
There is, however, considerable reason to believe that mutually
beneficial agreements between newspapers and aggregators will help
keep newsgathering a vital part of our society.

